A “National Congress” for Economic Sovereignty: The Context and Objective of the Economic Congress of Turkey (1923)
- Doğan Çetinkaya*
Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, İstanbul University, Beyazıt, Fatih, İstanbul, Turkey
Abstract
The Economic Congress of Turkey and Mustafa Kemal’s (Atatürk) inaugural speech are often seen in the literature as symbolic messages sent during the Lausanne peace negotiations. While many studies suggest that Turkey, by convening this congress, was expressing its desire to align with the Western world and endorse liberal economic principles, the situation was more nuanced. Mustafa Kemal and the Congress did not advocate for ideas that would favor foreign capital and Great Powers. One of the central themes of the Economic Congress was “economic independence,” aligning with the pre-existing concepts of National Economics. There was strong opposition to capitulations and privileges rooted in the National Economics tradition, accompanied by a skepticism towards the “West,” with an emphasis on independence.
Keywords: 1923, Economic Congress, National Sovereignty, Liberalism versus National Economy, Economic Independence
The Argument
The “Economic Congress of Turkey,” (Türkiye İktisat Kongresi) more commonly known as the “1923 İzmir Economic Congress,” convened in İzmir from February 17th to March 4th, 1923, under the initiative of the Ministry of Economics. This congress was significant not only for discussing the continuity and rupture theses and debates in the transition from the Empire to the Republic but also for providing essential insights into understanding the subsequent decades (particularly 1923-1946) after the foundational year of 1923.
The Turkish-Greek War ended on August 30, 1922, signifying the end of the period commonly referred to as the “National Struggle” or the “War of Independence” in Turkey. This protracted phase had extended the state of war for an additional four years beyond the culmination of World War I. Consequently, the military component of this transformative phase terminated, ushering in an era primarily characterized by political consolidation. It is within this context that the year 1923 assumes historical significance as a pivotal “foundational” year, marked by four salient developments of enduring consequence. Firstly, the population exchange agreement between Turkey and Greece aimed at homogenizing their respective populations; secondly, the convening of the Economic Congress of Turkey. Thirdly, the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923, and lastly, the declaration of the Republic on October 29, 1923.
Following the conclusion of the Turkish-Greek War, the Armistice of Mudanya was signed on October 3, 1922, and shortly thereafter, the Lausanne Peace Conference commenced in November 1922. However, due to unresolved disputes, negotiations were temporarily suspended on February 4, 1923, resulting in an interim lasting over two months. The protracted suspension was attributed to the persisting issues between the parties. Subsequently, negotiations resumed in April, culminating in the signing of the Treaty. The Economic Congress, took place during this interim period when the talks in Lausanne were temporarily interrupted. The Economic Congress is recognized as one of the significant events during the interlude in the Lausanne negotiations.
The congress and its opening day, as well as the inaugural speech delivered by Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatürk), are often interpreted as a symbolic message conveyed to the Lausanne negotiations. This symbolism arises from the fact that during the years of the National Struggle, one of the most crucial allies of Turkey was Soviet Russia. The Ankara Government not only secured diplomatic support and recognition from Soviet Russia but also received essential financial and arms aid. Consequently, debates regarding Turkey’s position between the “liberal West” and the Soviet Union were prevalent due to these circumstances.[1]
In this context, as emphasized in many studies, by convening this congress, Turkey was declaring its desire to be part of the Western world and endorsing the principles of liberal economics.[2] These are two commonly accepted and interconnected claims regarding the congress, often found in textbooks. Firstly, it is argued that the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) Government intended to convey a message that it saw its future aligned with the “Western Bloc” through this congress. Secondly, it is suggested that the congress heralded the liberal economic policies that would be pursued throughout the 1920’s. For instance, Mete Tunçay stated in his frequently cited work on the period: “However, it should be immediately noted that the predominant inclination toward private enterprise in this meeting is related to the Lausanne Peace Negotiations and aimed at building trust with the Allied States we were facing.”[3]
However, this perception regarding the congress did not align with the facts. Undoubtedly, it is a fact that the Economic Congress convened during a critical period when the Lausanne negotiations had been temporarily suspended, and it indeed conveyed significant messages to the external world. This aspect was undeniably pivotal to the congress. However, the message delivered was not as Mete Tunçay emphasized. The situation was not entirely as such.
The National Economy Sets the Stage
In order to evaluate this, it is essential to examine the state of the economic policy discourse known as “National Economy” (Milli İktisat) as it stood in 1923. The Economic Congress was essentially nothing more than a manifestation of the prevailing National Economy ideology within the contemporary context.
The dominant paradigm during the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918) was the concept and policies of National Economy. National Economy had a historical trajectory that extended from the July 23, 1908 revolution to the early years of the Republic, assuming various forms and having been implemented by different actors during this period. However, like many political ideologies, National Economy should not be considered independently of its social context and social dynamics.
National Economy can be broadly defined as an ideological and political movement that aimed to promote the economic and social development and economic independence of the Ottoman Empire. This movement arose in response to the belief that the classical liberal economic principles associated with the Manchester School had impaired the empire. Instead, proponents of National Economy sought to replace these principles with the protectionist ideas championed by the German School, led by Friedrich List. Within this framework, it was argued that the political revolution initiated during the early years of the Second Constitutional Period should be complemented and enhanced by economic and social revolutions.[4]
The core principles, slogans, concepts and objectives of National Economy included advocating for an increased role of the state in the economy, safeguarding and supporting nascent domestic enterprises, promoting the production and consumption of domestically manufactured goods, stimulating economic awakening, encouraging wealthy individuals to invest their capital, fostering the emergence of a national bourgeoisie from among the wealthy, waging economic warfare, implementing economic reforms, economic revolution, nurturing economic patriotism, and cultivating a sense of national economic ethics.[5]
National Economy, before the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars, initially embraced an Ottomanist discourse, aiming for a development encompassing all ethno-religious communities and social structures within the empire. However, it later underwent a shift in both content and objectives. While National Economy initially criticized the Ottoman Empire’s external dependence and advocated for its economic development, especially industrialization, it altered its focus after the Balkan Wars. Subsequently, it aimed at empowering Muslim and Turkish elements, especially contrary to non-Muslim communities, and even sought their liquidation and elimination. The economic purge of non-Muslims became a fundamental tenet within this framework.[6] Following the First World War, the Armistice Period, and the Turkish-Greek War, in an environment where the empire had disintegrated, National Economy continued to serve as an ideology for Muslim/Turkish nationalism and Turkification.[7] However, it was no longer a nationalist economic project within the empire; it was transformed into an economic program for the making of a nation-state.[8]
National Economy, throughout the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918) and beyond, reflected the demands of the rising Muslim/Turkish bourgeoisie. This social group had established numerous national companies and banks after the 1908 Revolution, and their economic influence had rapidly grown with the encouragement of the state elite and nationalist policies. The removal of capitulations thanks to the opportunity provided by the World War I and the demographic destruction of non-Muslims during the war further facilitated their ascent. In this context, National Economy constituted the economic program that accommodated both the demands and objectives of Muslimization/Turkification process and the interests of the Muslim/Turkish bourgeoisie.[9]
As highlighted above, National Economy encompassed various forms and actors. For instance, within the dominant political party of the era, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), two prominent figures advocated different approaches.[10] Cavid Bey, who would later become the Minister of Finance within the CUP, stood as one of the prominent representatives of liberal economic views within the empire. He held a cautious stance towards state intervention and protectionist policies, acting as a hindrance to initiatives in this direction.[11] On the other hand, individuals with significant ideological influence, like Ziya Gökalp, and groups affiliated with the Türk Yurdu journal, were promoting more protectionist policies during this era.[12] Furthermore, within the CUP, different factions were advocating for various implementations and even engaged in competition within the framework of National Economy policies.[13] Due to these differences, the policies that the Unionist governments initially sought to implement were more of a “stimulative” nature. More practical steps were attempted through unofficial grassroots initiatives, both before and after the Balkan Wars, targeting non-Muslims, such as boycotts. In addition to direct actions like boycotts, measures such as the Temporary Law for the Encouragement of Industry (Teşvik-i Sanayi Kanun-ı Muvakkatı) were part of Finance Minister Cavid Bey’s repertoire of National Economy actions. Establishing banks for instance, as effective and guiding actors in the market was also put forward which was in line with his liberal principles.
Within the framework of the National Economy ideology, initiatives to establish national companies and banks were undertaken, primarily led by Muslim/Turkish merchants, notables, and entrepreneurs in Anatolia. This was because the Muslim/Turkish landowner class, engaged in agricultural production for export, needed to enhance their competitive capabilities in order to become an entrepreneurial class. This involved reducing product prices and expanding their commercial activities.[14]
In this context, Muslim/Turkish merchants played a crucial role in the National Economy, forming the backbone of social support for these policies. They actively established local and national corporations, banks, and voluntary associations like the Society of Entrepreneurs (Cemiyet-i Müteşebbise) and the Society of National Industrialists (Milli Fabrikacılar Cemiyeti) and published periodicals advocating a national economy such as the Journal of Public Trade (Ticaret-i Umumiyye Mecmuası). These efforts were collectively referred to as “Economic Holy War” (İktisadi Cihad) or “Economic Warfare,” (Harb-i İktisadi) and they continued into the early years of the Republic.
The Economic Congress of Turkey in the Historiography
When the Economics Congress convened in 1923, it carried with it a legacy and heritage of this kind. Therefore, in the history of National Economy, the Congress served as a significant link between the imperial and republican eras from an economic perspective. The Congress was comprised of four groups: the “Farmers Group,” the “Merchants Group,” the “Industrialists Group,” and the “Workers Group.” Each group had its representatives, agenda, and proposals for the Congress. This meeting was, in fact, also an outcome of another significant vein that emerged within National Economics, known as “Occupational Representation” (Mesleki Temsil).[15]
The concept of “Occupational Representation” advocated that true representation could only be achieved when the actual owners and producers of a country were directly involved in governing the country.[16] To realize this idea, producers representing their professions should form the parliament. This corporatist trend aimed to establish “occupational representation” as a constitutional regime but ultimately, the parliamentary system based on general elections prevailed.[17] However, the influence of this trend was significant enough to manifest in the rhetoric of prominent political figures. Hence, for example, the 1135 participants in the Economic Congress were selected according to their professional groups.
Following the military victory, the most challenging issues in the peace negotiations at the Lausanne Conference revolved around economic matters. One of the central and contentious issues during the Lausanne negotiations was the reinstatement of capitulations, which had been unilaterally abolished by the CUP government during World War I. This matter, along with the question of debts, became one of the most heated topics of discussion in the negotiations in Lausanne.
One should highlight the fact that, despite the substantial attention given to the 1923 Congress in studies of the era and particularly in textbooks focusing on Turkey, there has not been a scholarly monograph dedicated to it to date. It’s worth emphasizing that the most valuable work on this subject is still the 1968 compilation by A. Gündüz Ökçün, which brings together numerous primary sources related to the Congress.[18] Indeed, it’s quite remarkable that, apart from some document transcriptions that contributed to the compilation by A. Gündüz Ökçün, there haven’t been any scholarly work in the Turkish literature that engage in a scientific discussion or offer analysis on this matter.[19] The fact that there has not been a single doctoral dissertation on this topic, according to the inventory of the Council of Higher Education (YÖK-Yüksek Öğrenim Kurumu), is quite telling. This situation might also be related to the fact that the founding generation of the Republic hardly ever mentioned this congress later on.[20]
The Economics Congress of 1923 was a platform where Ankara government asserted itself against the West in the prevailing conditions of the time, while also facing various political and economic circles within the country. It provided an opportunity for different political and social actors to express themselves. Two contributions that have placed the Economics Congress of Turkey within this context and conducted scholarly discussions are the works of Margaret S. Hoell, published in 1980, and Michael M. Finefrock, published in 1981. First scholarly contributions came out as late as early 1980’s.[21] It is indeed intriguing that it took many years for a 12-page article to be written in 2000 that only tries to truly explain the name of the congress.[22] It was only after a long period that an assessment of the topic was finally made first by Zafer Toprak in 1993 and by Murat Koraltürk in 2009 in semi-academic journals.[23] Two other significant studies are Eyüp Özveren and Hüseyin Safa Ünal’s paper on the influence of Ziya Gökalp’s view on the congress published in 2013 and İhsan Ömer Atagenç’s article that approached the subject from various dimensions and backgrounds, breaking free from the literature’s stagnation, published in 2017.[24]
What was the reason for this forgetting or lack of interest outside of textbooks? Why wasn’t there any research done on one of the significant events of 1923 in historiography? As I will discuss below, even though the Congress had shaped or reflected the economic mindset of the following period for many years, it had been abandoned in oblivion. The corporatist “Occupational Representation” (Mesleki Temsil) view, one of the intellectual trends that left its mark on the era, was also brought up during the Economic Congress. This influence dwindled later but it used to be a powerful trend during the National Struggle and in 1923. However, as Toprak emphasized, this idea did not have a significant impact at the constitutional level. Many of its representatives were members of the CUP. In fact, for Toprak, this was also one of the reasons why this congress was eventually forgotten.[25]
Furthermore, despite its significance in economic history, it was overshadowed by other major developments for the elites. In addition to this, the speeches made there were already expressed at different times and places, as will be shown below. In fact, the importance of the Economic Congress could be questioned even during that time. For instance, first and foremost, Mustafa Kemal’s reason for coming to Izmir was not solely to attend this congress. Upon his arrival in Izmir, Mustafa Kemal immediately visited the grave of his mother. Zübeyde Hanım had passed away on January 14, 1923. Just two days after his arrival, on January 29, 1923, he married Latife Hanım. While Mustafa Kemal was engaged in important meetings in Izmir, the most crucial item on his agenda was the establishment of the People’s Party (Halk Fırkası).[26] Indeed, even years later, Soviet Union Ambassador Aralov remembered that the opposition claimed that Mustafa Kemal used this congress to shine a light on himself for the purpose of establishing a new party.[27] His mind was focused on the heated debates and criticisms taking place in the Meclis (Turkish Parliament) regarding the negotiations at the Lausanne Conference. Meanwhile, discussions were ongoing about the note dated February 6, 1923, in which the Ankara Government had requested the Allied states to withdraw their warships from the port of Izmir.[28]
Indeed, on February 17, 1923, immediately after delivering the opening speech at the congress, Mustafa Kemal left İzmir and met with İsmet Pasha, who had returned from Lausanne, on February 19, 1923, in Eskişehir before heading together to Ankara. Therefore, it is not appropriate to consider the İzmir Economic Congress, as a gathering that took place only for the break in Lausanne negotiations and as a message of inclusion in the “West.” In this sense, it needs to be contextualized.
In order to do this, I would like to focus on Mustafa Kemal’s opening speech which has rightly been highlighted the most so far. Specifically, I will examine Mustafa Kemal’s opening speech in the context of his statements about the economy before and after the congress. Additionally, I will also discuss the congress speech of Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt) Bey, who was not only the Minister of Economics at the time but also a key figure in convening the congress.[29] I will also examine his speech (similar to Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s) in the context of the statements and assessments he made before and after the Congress. Another significant figure in the congress was Kazım Karabekir Pasha, who was elected as the president of the congress. In fact, the “Misak-ı İktisadi” (Economic Pact) published after the congress, which received criticism for its lack of relevance to economics, was his work. Since he did not have a significant role in economic life and thought before or after the congress, I will not focus primarily on Kazım Karabekir Pasha’s activities during the congress. Another important figure is Ahmet Hamdi (Başar) Bey, who served as the secretary of the congress and had a unique place in the history of economic thought and economic civil society organizations.
Although the names of these four men will come to the forefront, the Economic Congress of Turkey was an event where women were visible. One of the most well-known photos of Mustafa Kemal from those days was from the congress where he attended with his wife Latife Hanım. It was actually the congress of women held in the same venue the day before the Economic Congress of Turkey. Women representatives of the working class, another segment that constituted the congress, also attended: women workers like Hayriye, Emine, Şefika, Münire, and Nigar, representing the labor sector.[30] In fact, one of the closing speeches was delivered by Rukiye Hanım, representing working women. A woman named Mücahide Fatma Hanım was also sent to the congress on behalf of the farming sector.[31] Kazım Karabekir Paşa emphasized the sacrifices made by women during the National Struggle, and Minister of Economy Mahmut Esat Bey, in his speech, addressed the audience by first mentioning them and consistently saying “Ladies and gentlemen…” during his speech.
Tracing and Infering the “Words” in the Congress
Mustafa Kemal’s speech at the congress was aimed at the old regime, foreigners, and primarily non-Muslims. The path he advocated to escape foreign domination, in other words, colonization, was for the state to become independent and to abolish the privileges of foreigners and non-Muslims. Mustafa Kemal dedicated his opening speech to the economic independence, which was also the most critical issue at the Lausanne talks. The cornerstone of the general National Economy concept and economic ideology of the Second Constitutional Era was independence.[32] Capitulations played a major role in this issue. According to him, true liberation and independence could be achieved not only through military victories but also through successes and developments in the field of economics. His famous emphasis on replacing the “sword” with the “plow” highlighted this point, underlining the importance of economics:
“The principle for complete independence is as follows: National sovereignty must be supported by economic sovereignty. Such great goals, such sacred and lofty objectives cannot be achieved with mere words, desires, or ambitions. To ensure the complete realization of these objectives, the strongest foundation is the economy. No matter how significant our political and military victories may be, they can only bear fruit when complemented by economic success. To secure the beneficial outcomes that also crown our most potent and brilliant victories, it is necessary to establish and strengthen economic sovereignty.”[33]
Like Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Mahmut Esat Bey also emphasized similar points in his opening speech at the congress:
“Life is a satellite of economic activities and events… I understand national sovereignty as national economic sovereignty. Otherwise, national sovereignty becomes a “mirage”… Turkish national sovereignty can only endure based on Turkish economic sovereignty… I wish for this not only for the people of Turkey but also for all the oppressed economic elements of the world… The new Turkey demands the rights, freedom, and independence of the plow, the hammer, labor, intellect, and competence, and it fights in a way that can dismantle any external and internal force that stands in its way.”[34]
The same emphasis, that military victory should be crowned with economic victory, was also the closing statement of Kazım Karabekir, who was elected as the president of the Congress.[35]
One point to note in Mustafa Kemal’s speech at the Congress is that it was a repetition or summary of the speeches he had been making in various parts of Anatolia for some time. Some of his speeches had word-for-word repetitions.[36] This was similar to Mahmut Esat Bey’s speech, which showed continuity with his previous statements. For example, Mustafa Kemal made a similar emphasis when he addressed the public in Bursa on October 17, 1922, immediately after the Mudanya Armistice was signed:
“The vastness of the country, the abilities of the nation, and the bayonets of their armies will produce all kinds of results in peacetime as well. After this struggle that lasted for three and a half years, we will continue our efforts from the perspective of knowledge, education, and economics. I am confident that we will succeed in this as well. We will become industrialists. We will become craftsmen. Let’s dedicate our minds to this from now on.”[37]
Mahmut Esat Bey, three months before becoming the Minister of Economy, emphasized in his statement how Turks had achieved wonders with the power of the plow. He stated that for real victories, the loom, the workshop, and the plow should be placed against weapons.[38]
Rather than analyzing the opening speech in isolation, it would be more appropriate to read it within this context and continuity, as Mustafa Kemal continued to make similar speeches after the 1923 Economic Congress. This approach is more accurate in understanding and interpreting the period.
In his speeches at the Congress and elsewhere, the main emphasis was on “economic independence.” He highlighted the cornerstones of the general National Economy discourse and economic ideology of the Second Constitutional Period. The most important element of this discourse was the portrayal of Turks and Muslims as the dominant element who had been suffering in their own country for years, with the main culprits being foreign economic entities and their collaborator non-Muslim locals. While Turks/Muslims were risking their lives on the battlefronts in recent years, non-Muslims had consolidated their positions within the economy. The capitulations had also supported this situation by granting privileges to Westerners and their “non-Turkish” representatives. In this context, both in his previous speeches and at the Economic Congress, Mustafa Kemal did not promote ideas that would create a favorable sentiment toward foreign capital and Great Powers. On the contrary, the predominant tone in his speeches was accusatory.[39]
In fact, alongside this aspect, it had been reiterated in the literature several times that there was no fundamental opposition to foreign capital in principle during the Congress. The literature had developed an interpretation focusing precisely on this point. Fikret Başkaya rightly tried to emphasize that the National Struggle was not anti-imperialist, and he interpreted the statements that “there is no opposition to foreign capital” as the primary reason for the Congress’s convening.[40] However, even though the National Struggle and the period after 1923 were not explicitly anti-capitalist, and therefore they cannot be classified as anti-imperialist, sentences beginning with “foreign capital” were always accompanied by a “but” before and during the Congress, and in the statements made afterward. Assurances regarding foreign capital were only expressed with a specific condition. That condition was the abolition of privileges, namely the capitulations:
“Gentlemen, when we discuss and think about economics, let it not be mistaken that we are adversaries of foreign capital; no, our country is open to it. We need a large amount of capital. As long as they adhere to our laws, foreign capital should be subordinated to our interests and should yield beneficial results for both us and them.
In the past, after the Tanzimat period, foreign capital held an exceptional position. The state and government did nothing more than act as a guardian for foreign capital. Like any new nation, Turkey cannot accept this. We will not turn this place into a country of slaves.”[41]
Same day, Mahmut Esat expressed a similar statemet regarding the same issue:
“Let there be no misunderstanding that by pointing in this direction, the new Turkey’s school of economics harbors any prejudice, hostility, or resentment against foreign capital. No, as our dear leader, Gazi Pasha, mentioned earlier, we will not leave Turkey as a land of slaves in the hands of foreign capital. However, for foreign capital that wishes to earn and live in our country in a legitimate way, subject to our laws and regulations, without pursuing any privileges or deceit beyond those granted to Turkish citizens, we are always ready to provide all kinds of facilities in our country, even exceeding the facilities offered by other nations.”[42]
Indeed, Mahmut Esat made a similar speech in the parliament on December 30, 1922, before the rumors surfaced during the congress. In that speech, he also emphasized the “but” part.[43] For example, in a similar manner, months before, in an interview with the Anadolu’da Yeni Gün newspaper, he highlighted that the Turkish economy had served the interests of foreigners for centuries. According to him, the Turkish economy had been in the service of foreigners for many years.[44] Therefore, Mahmut Esat, with his accusatory rhetoric, was building a certain opposition.
“I can tell you this much, Turkey’s economy must strive to break free from the tremendous competition of foreign nations after the peace. And it is possible. Unless our economy is freed from foreign economic domination, our independence will always be in danger. Indeed, in this case, Turkey would be a kind of slave of foreign capital.”[45]
According to Mahmut Esat, those who left national economy defenseless were foreign capital that works against the country and also the non-Muslim elements who acted as intermediaries for them.[46] In his view, non-Muslims were not even representatives of cash capital; they were merely a bridge. He argued that with their disappearance, the real threat of foreign capital was now directly faced.[47] In this confrontation, he wanted both an equal relationship without capitulations and emphasized the necessity for Turkey to be a self-sufficient country.
In other words, it’s clear that a friendly message was not conveyed to the West. “Complete independence” (istiklal-i tam) could only be achieved by winning against the West. The language and rhetoric were tailored to this idea. In fact, the sentences expressing a lack of opposition to foreign capital were responses to circulating rumors and news, especially in Athens and London, which claimed that Turkey and the upcoming Economic Congress were being convened against foreign capital.[48] One of these responses even brought up an assertion that we encounter in official circles today. Criticisms of Turkey were attributed to “jealousy against the Turkish economic character.”
Indeed, in his opening speech, Mahmut Esat divided Turkey’s economic history into four parts. He emphasized that despite the patriotic “great men” using “good politics” during the Tanzimat and Meşrutiyet periods, the country remained defenseless against the economic invasion of foreign capital. The worst result of this was the capitulations. Mahmut Esat stated: “On the surface, the country was ours. But in reality, economically, Turkey was more the country of foreigners, a colony.”[49]
In addition to the responses given to these rumors, the fundamental economic discourse maintained during the National Struggle focused on independence and maintaining distance from the two blocs. If the primary message to the Western world were about a liberal economic order, then perhaps the most important foreign guest would not have been Soviet envoy Aralov. Although there were British and United States acting consuls at the congress, the speeches by Aralov and the presence of Abilov, the representative of the Azerbaijan Soviet, who died during the congress, were more prominent.[50]
Indeed, during the turbulent years that began with the 1873 Crisis and extended through the Great Depression of 1929 until the end of World War II, countries and regimes were increasingly turning inward. As a result, both liberalism and market economics did not have the same global influence as they did in the mid-19th century. Foreign capital, during the early 1920s, in the aftermath of the ongoing World War, was not very eager to invest either.[51] Neither the Economics Congress can be considered as a liberal event as highlighted in the history of economics literature nor were the 1920’s a period characterized by liberalism. Liberalism, like everything else, has its own historical context and has undergone significant transformations over time. The 1920’s was a period marked by a severe crisis for liberalism. Additionally, among the prominent figures at the Congress were Mahmut Esat, the Minister of Economics who was a supporter of the Professional Representation (Mesleki Temsil), and Ahmet Hamdi Bey, a representative of the National Turkish Commerce Union (Milli Türk Ticaret Birliği), who had reservations about liberalism.[52]
Mahmut Esat Bey had a very clear stance on liberalism, which he emphasized both during the Congress and in his previous statements. He explicitly stated that they did not belong to any economic school of thought. According to him, the path Turkey was following was unique and he called it the “New Turkey School of Economics.” While it incorporated elements from various perspectives, it did not align with the “laissez faire et laissez passer” (bırakınız geçsinler, bırakınız yapsınlar) school of thought, nor was it socialist, communist, or statist in nature.[53] Mahmut Esat Bey emphasized the importance of individual initiative while also highlighting the necessity for the state to establish and manage both credit institutions and industrial enterprises due to the economic situation of the country.[54] In another interview with the Hakimiyet-i Milliye newspaper, he stated that the “free school of economics” (serbest iktisat mektebi) had become obsolete. According to him, this “old school” (ihtiyar mekteb) had already died even in its countries of origin. He stressed that these principles, which had been adhered to with great loyalty since the Tanzimat period and especially during the Constitutional period (Meşrutiyet), had done nothing more than play a destructive role in the economic and financial affairs of the country: “Since the Tanzimat era and especially during the Meşrutiyet period, this school, to which principles were adhered with great fidelity, has done nothing more than play a crushing, destructive, and lethal role in our country’s economy and finance.”[55] In a bill draft he prepared in the parliament, Mahmut Esat Bey also made an evaluation of liberalism, indirectly referring to it with the expression “ laissez faire et laissez passer,” (bırakınız yapsınlar, bırakınız geçsinler) describing it as a “worn-out and deceased economic principle” (köhne ve ölmüş iktisat prensibi).[56]
On the other hand, during the Turkish War of Independence, as relations with Soviet Russia were developing, assessments and messages were already being made against communism. Therefore, for such messages an Economic Congress was not necessary. Mustafa Kemal’s evaluation in 1921 sent a clear message both to the West and to those who would engage in left-wing social and political struggles in Turkey:
“In our relations with the Russians, we have not primarily touched upon capitalism or communism, that is, we have not been said that you must be a communist in order to meet or that you must become one. Such a principle does not exist. Only the Russian Bolshevik Government is communist, and its main goal is this. It wants to implement this idea, this fundamental social principle, to all nations. I would like to clarify that we will not prevent this or say you will not do it. To say that would mean we do not recognize the existence of the Russian Bolshevik Government and reject it means that we cannot do that. However, we are obliged to take strong measures against it coming in a way that could harm our country and our nation, and in taking these measures, they certainly cannot oppose us. The government is different. The officials of the government are different. And besides that, the activities of societies within the nation are different. You are aware that in our dealings with the Russian Government, we address a different interlocutor, yet, on the other hand, some irresponsible individuals might take initiatives to introduce Russian communism entirely to the country. Therefore, this is a social issue. We are not talking about a social revolution here. It depends on the development and capacity of that nation.”[57]
Mustafa Kemal, in an interview with Istanbul journalists in Izmit in January 1923, used the term “fallacy” from time to time to describe communism in Russia, similar to how he referred to it in his speeches.[58] Just a few days before this interview, when speaking about the importance of the economy in Eskişehir, he said the following:
“First of all, one must become rich. Because money is what enables everything to happen… Instead of trying to make those who are currently considered rich poorer, we should strive to make the poor and those in the middle class richer!”[59]
Of course, alongside close diplomatic relations with Russia, there were also statements that could be interpreted as rapprochement with the Soviets in this “game of balance.” When Mustafa Kemal met with the public at the Izmit Cinema on January 19, 1923, he expressed the following sentences that could be seen in this light:
“Our government is no longer a despotic government. It’s not an absolute or constitutional government either. Our government is not like the French or American Republics. Our government is a government of the people. It is a complete soviet (şura) government. In the new Turkey, sovereignty belongs to the nation.”[60]
Certainly, we can find many more examples of this kind. Before the Economic Congress of Turkey in İzmir, Mustafa Kemal and officials from the Ankara government had repeatedly expressed similar themes. They emphasized their efforts to find a path between the “East” and the “West” and mentioned their readiness to make pragmatic choices when required.
“Certainly, there is a balance in the world. We are not exclusive to either side of this balance. It might be considered a valid approach to establish contact with a major power in the East or one or more powers in the West, form relationships, and perhaps even alliances to determine our position within this balance. The question arises whether we can be content with relying solely on our existence without attaching importance to either the East or the West.
To tell the truth, the politics that are currently worth relying on and trustworthy are those that rely solely on our existence. We cannot emotionally attach ourselves to either the East or the West. However, this does not mean that it is impossible or incorrect to lean more towards one side in the face of developments that may occur in the future.”[61]
Before the Economic Congress held in Izmir, many of the issues raised in this congress had already been repeatedly addressed both domestically and internationally. One of the most important elements of the Economic Congress was “economic independence.” This concept had a significant continuity with the inherited notion of National Economics from the previous era. Mustafa Kemal had started emphasizing “economic independence” more than political and military independence long before the Izmir congress. In a statement he made on January 29, 1921, he mentioned the two main sources of suffering for the nation: the despots, referring to the Istanbul Government and the monarchy, and the “imperialist and capitalist world.” The awakening, called “intibah,” which emerged during the National Struggle, was directed against these two forces.[62] Throughout the National Struggle, Mustafa Kemal’s speeches served as prototypes for the speech he would deliver at the Izmir Economic Congress.[63] For example, in Izmit, one month before Izmir, he stated:
“The new state of Turkey will lay its foundations not with the sword alone but through the economic means upon which the sword relies. The new state of Turkey will not be a conquering state, but it will be an economic state.”[64]
On his way to Izmir in early 1923, Mustafa Kemal visited another city, Bursa, after Eskişehir and Izmit. While answering questions there, he emphasized that foreign capital should come to the country in a way that would not harm it. Mustafa Kemal mentioned the harm caused by foreign capital in places it had entered. He even stated that the Turkish Islamic Empire in India had collapsed due to privileges granted to a British land company. In Alaşehir, where he was on January 25-26, he said the following:
“Friends, from now on, we will achieve great victories. However, these victories will not be sword victories but victories of economics, knowledge, and wisdom. The victories our army has achieved so far cannot be considered as leading our country to true salvation. These victories have only prepared valuable time for future victories. Let us not take pride in our victorious soldiers. Let us prepare for new victories in knowledge and economics.”[65]
Conclusion
As Fikret Başkaya and many others emphasize, there was no explicit anti-imperialism or anti-capitalism stance. However, there was a strong opposition to capitulations and privileges, stemming from the tradition of National Economics, and a skepticism towards the “West,” emphasizing the concept of independence. This became particularly crucial during the National Struggle and after the military victory of the “Great Offensive” when the negotiations in Lausanne were suspended. The subsequent period was expected to be one where foreign capital would find local political and economic partners in an environment without capitulations.[66]
The Economic Congress had two significant motivations. The first was to send a message to the Lausanne negotiations. However, this message, as emphasized by Zürcher, aimed to underline the “red line” that economic independence would not be compromised in any way.[67]
So, there was no concern about sending a message that Turkey belonged to the “Western” world. In fact, messages related to liberalism, foreign capital, and the Western world in general were largely negative, even accusatory. More importantly, as extensively quoted above, Mustafa Kemal’s opening speech at the Economic Congress described those who prevented Turkey from achieving peace after a military victory and resisted the abolition of capitulations as “our true enemies.”[68]
Indeed, after 1923, the United Kingdom maintained a distant and reserved stance compared to the Ottoman period when it came to Turkey. According to British intelligence assessments, the United Kingdom had become unable to gather information about both Mustafa Kemal and Turkey throughout the 1920s. This situation was a result of the cautious and skeptical view towards the West seen during and before the Economic Congress. When examining official country reports from the United Kingdom’s Foreign Office bureaucracy after 1923, it becomes evident that these reports were composed of general information that could be found in newspapers. Consequently, the Special Operations Executive (SOE), specialized in the economic and social characteristics of other countries, repeatedly reported that the United Kingdom lacked a deep understanding of Turkey’s internal affairs and balances.[69]
The second motivation was to hold the congress in Izmir, which had been liberated by Ankara, instead of Istanbul, where it was initially organized by leading representatives of capital class in Istanbul. Ankara wanted to assert its control, essentially “stealing the role” from Istanbul. This is why one of the most significant early actions taken by the Ministry of Economy, which was responsible for the preparatory meetings, was to ensure the postponement of the congress originally planned to be held in Istanbul by the National Turkish Commerce Union.[70] Istanbul’s capitalist circles intended to make a move both economically and politically in 1924, but Ankara, by exerting its influence, thwarted this attempt.[71]
In addition, the congress was important in terms of emphasizing economic salvation, economic sovereignty, and independence. However, both during the years it took place and afterward, the congress was described as a “fiasco.”[72] This failure was mostly attributed to the Misak-ı İktisadi document written at the initiative of Kazım Karabekir Pasha after the congress. It was argued that this document focused more on matters other than economics and was centered on “morality.” The secretary of the congress, Ahmet Hamdi Başar, wrote in his memoirs that he transcribed the text as dictated by Kazım Karabekir. He also mentioned that he had warned Karabekir while writing it. Therefore, as a person engaged in economic publishing, he had no influence on the content. Furthermore, Mahmut Esat Bey, who was the head of the Ministry of Economy, which organized the congress, stated to journalists the next day that he was not aware of the declared Misak-ı İktisadi.[73] Shortly afterward, under his leadership, another publication titled “Our Economic Principles” (İktisat Esaslarımız) was released, which reflected the debates at the congress and the participating groups.[74]
However, despite the declaration, there is no doubt that the Economic Congress was an important gathering that brought together various professional groups, different social classes, their representatives, the Anatolian bourgeoisie, representatives of Istanbul’s capital, and the representatives of the new regime in Ankara, which were the key social and political actors of the time. The messages confirmed the continuation of the concept of national economics. Therefore, we can question and possibly dismiss another general understanding in the literature accordingly.
In economic history, there is a periodization proposed by Korkut Boratav with certain reservations. According to this periodization, the 1920’s considered liberal, and the 1930’s more state interventionist. It is claimed that the fundamental characteristics of liberalism in the 1920’s were expressed and formulated during the 1923 Economic Congress.
Yet, there was not a radical break between the 1920’s and the 1930’s. This underscores the idea that the dominant paradigm expressed during the Economic Congress of Turkey applied not only to the 1920’s but also to the 1930’s with proposals for a national economy. What was discussed, the alternatives proposed, and the recommendations and demands made during the Economic Congress are common points between the 1920’s and the 1930’s. This suggests that it would be more useful to consider the 1920’s and the 1930’s as periods with significant continuity rather than a radical break. Therefore, revisiting the place of the Economic Congress of Turkey in historiography would provide a more meaningful understanding of historical facts. The discussions of social and political actors at the Economic Congress would leave their mark on the first few decades of the republic.
- Doğan Çetinkaya is an associate professor of Political History, İstanbul University, Faculty of Political Sciences, İstanbul, Turkey. He is the editor-in-chief of the Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar (History and Society New Approaches) journal.
* CONTACT Y. Doğan Çetinkaya yudoce@istanbul.edu.tr
[1] Oktay Yenal, Cumhuriyet’in İktisat Tarihi, Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, İstanbul, 2017, p. 52.
[2] Sabahattin Selek, Anadolu İhtilali, Cem Yayınevi, İstanbul,1976, p. 709.
[3] Mete Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi’nin Kurulması (1923-1931), Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, 1999, p. 188. For a similar approach see Baskın Oran, “Dönemin Bilançosu,” Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşı’ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Vol. I, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2012, p. 107; Zafer Toprak, “70. Yılında İzmir İktisat Kongresi,” Görüş, 8, 1993, p. 68-69.
[4] Zafer Toprak, Milli İktisat – Milli Burjuvazi, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, 1995, pp. 10-22.
[5] Zafer Toprak, Türkiye’de Milli İktisat 1908-1918, Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, İstanbul, 2019.
[6] Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, 1908 Osmanlı Boykotu: Bir Toplumsal Hareketin Analizi, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004, pp. 133-172; Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, Osmanlı’yı Müslümanlaştırmak: Kitle Siyaseti, Toplumsal Sınıflar, Boykotlar ve Milli İktisat (1909-1914), İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2015, pp. 67-226.
[7] Vedat Eldem, Harp ve Mütareke Yıllarında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun İktisadi Şartları Hakkında Bir Tetkik, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 1994; Zafer Toprak, İttihad-Terakki ve Cihan Harbi: Savaş Ekonomisi ve Türkiye’de Devletçilik, Homer Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2003.
[8] Murat Koraltürk, Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Ekonominin Türkleştirilmesi, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011); Ayhan Aktar, Türk Milliyetçiliği, Gayrimüslimler ve Ekonomik Dönüşüm, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006).
[9] Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, The Young Turks and the Boycott Movement: Nationalism, Protest and the Working Classes in the Formation of Modern Turkey, I.B. Tauris, Londra, 2014.
[10] Diren Çakmak, Osmanlı İktisat Düşüncesinin Evrimi Societas ve Universitas Gerilimi, Libra Kitap, İstanbul, 2012.
[11] For Cavid Bey see Ayşe Köse Bodur, “A Civil Unionist: The Biography of Mehmed Cavid Bey 1876-1926,” PhD Dissertation, Boğaziçi University, 2021.
[12] Hüseyin Safa Ünal, “Türk Yurdu ve İktisadiyat Mecmuası’nda “Milli İktisat”,” in Seven Ağır ve Alp Yücel Kaya (eds), Sonrası Kalır: Milli İktisat, İktisadi Düşünce ve İktisat Tarihi, İmge Kitabevi, Ankara: 2023, pp. 93-144.
[13] Erol Ülker, “Military, Finance and Economy in the Late Ottoman Empire: Directorate-General of Hedjaz and Military Railways and Ports, 1914-1919”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 22 (1), 2020, pp. 17-28.
[14] In recent years, field studies and archival research have revealed the role played by the Muslim/Turkish bourgeoisie during this period. It is clear that this class left its mark on the Economic Congress in many ways. For references on this literature, see. Semih Gökatalay, The Political Economy of Corporations in the Late Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic (1908-1929), Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Başkanlığı, Ankara, 2019; E. Attila Aytekin, Üretim Düzenleme İsyan: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Toprak Meselesi, Arazi Hukuku ve Köylülük, Dipnot, Ankara, 2021; Alp Yücel Kaya, “Balkanlar ve Batı Anadolu’da İlk Birikimin Gelişimi (1839-1914), Devrimci Marksizm, 45-46, 2021, pp. 11-66; Neslişah Leman Başaran, “Özel Teşebbüs, Tekel ve Devlet: Türkiye’de Cumhuriyet’in Kuruluşunda Ticaret ve Sanayi Burjuvazisi,” PhD Dissertation, Marmara University, 2014; Yaşar Tolga Cora, “A Muslim Great Merchant Family in the Late Ottoman Emire: A Case Study of the Nemlizades, 1860-1930,” International Journal of Turkish Studies, (19) 1-2, 2013; Ayla Ezgi Akyol, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda İlksel Birikim ve Kapitalist Devlet Oluşumu,” PhD Dissertation, İstanbul University, 2022; Y Doğan Çetinkaya, “İtibar-ı Milli Bankası ve İş Bankası Birleşmesi (1927): Bir Banka Birleşmesi Üzerinden Müslüman/Türk Burjuvazisi Üzerine Tarihyazımını Düşünmek,” Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar, 21, 2023, pp. 153-203; Neslişah L. Başaran Lotz, “Türkiye’de Burjuvazinin Gelişiminde Tüccarlar: Müslüman-Türk Aileler ve Ticaret Ağları, Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar, 21, 2023, pp. 204-246; Yaşar Tolga Cora, “Nemlizadeler: Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Ekonomipolitiğinde Milli Tüccarı Aramak,” Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar, 21, 2023, pp. 247-270.
[15] Hakkı Uyar, “Sol Milliyetçi” Bir Türk Aydını Mahmut Esat Bozkurt (1892-1943), Büke Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000, p. 42.
[16] Erol Ülker, Meşrutiyet’ten Cumhuriyet’e Mesleki Temsil ve Sol, Yordam Kitap, İstanbul, 2023; Erol Ülker, “Osmanlı Savaş Ekonomisi ve Bir Muhalefet Programı Olarak Temsil-i Meslekî: İmparatorluğun Son Yıllarında Sermaye-İktidar İlişkileri Üzerine Notlar”, Alternatif Politika, 12 (1), 2020, pp. 260-280; İlhan Tekeli ve Selim İlkin, “(Kör) Ali İhsan (İloğlu) Bey ve Temsil-i Mesleki Programı”, Cumhuriyetin Harcı: Köktenci Modernitenin Doğuşu, Vol. I, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2003, pp. 355-436.
[17] Zafer Toprak, “100. Yıldönümünde Türkiye İktisat Kongresi,” Toplumsal Tarih, 350, 2023, p. 13; Zafer Toprak, “Türkiye’de Korporatizmin Doğuşu,” Toplum ve Bilim, 12, 1980, pp. 41-49.
[18] Türkiye İktisat Kongresi 1923 – İzmir Haberler, Belgeler-Yorumlar, A. Gündüz Ökçün (ed), (Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Yayınları, Ankara, 1968. Later on, Afet İnan also published documents and minutes related to the congress: Afet İnan, İzmir İktisat Kongresi 17 Şubat – 4 Mart 1923, TTK, Ankara, 1982.
[19] The texts that Ökçün has already published continue to be published as articles in 2019 with minor additions: Mehmet Kayıran ve Selami Saygın, “İzmir İktisat Kongresi,” Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi Türk Dünyası Uygulama ve Araştırma Merkezi Yakın Tarih Dergisi, (2) 5, 2019, pp. 27-70. Mehmet Ö. Alkan, “1923 Türkiye İktisat Kongresi’ne Katkı (1),” Birikim, 21, 1991, p. 53-58; Mehmet Ö. Alkan, “Türkiye İktisat Kongresi -1923- İzmir’e Katkı 2,” A.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, (47) 1-2, 1992, p. 395-402; Mehmet Ö. Alkan, “Türkiye İktisat Kongresi 1923’e Katkı (3),” Birikim, 38-39, 1992, p. 132-136; Murat Koraltürk, “17 Şubat-4 Mart 1923 İzmir Türkiye İktisat Kongresi’nin Belgeleri,” Toplumsal Tarih, 85, 2001, p. 23-25. This tradition of publishing documents rather than providing an evaluation and analysis, continues even during the 100th anniversary of the congress. The book compiled by Serdar Şahinkaya largely consists of material from Gündüz Ökçün’s compilation but has been published as a new book: Serdar Şahinkaya, Cumhuriyet’ten Önceki Son Kurucu Kongre Türkiye İktisat Kongresi, Telgrafhane Yayınları, Ankara, 2023.
[20] Bilsay Kuruç, Mustafa Kemal Döneminde Ekonomi: Büyük Devletler ve Türkiye, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2012, p. 302. After 1923, various economic congresses were held within the following 100 years, but no noteworthy academic work would emerge from them. For these congresses, see Metin Toprak, “İzmir İktisat Kongresi: Bir Gelecek Perspektifi,” İktisat, İşletme ve Finans, 2004, p. 115-131.
[21] Margaret S. Hoell, “Atatürk and the “İlk Türkiye İktisat Kongresi”,” Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, (4) 2, 1980, pp. 1-9; Michael M. Firefrock, “Laisses-Faire, the 1923 Izmir Economic Congress and Early Turkish Developmental Policy in Political Perspective,” Middle Eastern Studies, (17) 3, 1981, pp. 375-392. For a disscussion on details in between them see: Michael M. Firefrock, “The 1923 Izmir Economic Congress – A Different View,” Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, (5) 2, 1981, pp. 29-30; Margaret S. Hoell, “Comment on “A Different View”,” Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, (5) 2, 1981, pp. 31-32.
[22] Erdinç Tokgöz, “Türkiye İktisat Kongresi” Mi? “İzmir İktisat Kongresi Mi? Hangisi Doğru?” H.Ü. İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, (18) 1, 2000, pp. 339-349.
[23] Zafer Toprak, 1993, pp. 68-69; for the reprint of Koraltürk’s article see: Murat Koraltürk, op. cit., s. 95-109; and with minor changes again here: Arzu Varlı ve Murat Koraltürk, “II. Meşrutiyet’ten Erken Cumhuriyet’e Milli İktisadın Sürekliliği ve İzmir İktisat Kongresi,” Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi, (9) 20-21, 2010, pp. 127-142.
[24] Prof. Dr. Eyüp Özveren and Arş. Gör. Hüseyin Safa Ünal, “İktisadi Düşünce Açısından Ziya Gökalp ve İzmir İktisat Kongresi,” İkinci İktisat Kongresi Bildirileri 1, Fırat Üniversitesi İnsani ve Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi, Elazığ, 2013, p. 254; İhsan Ömer Atagenç, “İzmir İktisat Kongresi’nin Türk Dış Politikasının İnşasındaki Rolü,” Kırklareli Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, (6) 5, 2017, pp. 91-101.
[25] Zafer Toprak, “Türkiye İktisat Kongresi ve “Misak-ı İktisadi”,” pp. 29-30.
[26] Michael M. Firefrock, op. cit., p. 385.
[27] Semyon İvanoviç Aralov, Bir Sovyet Diplomatının Türkiye Anıları 1922-1924, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2022, p. 224.
[28] Margaret S. Hoell, op. cit., p. 4.
[29] Cihan Yamakoğlu, M. Esat Bozkurt, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara, 1987; Nail Topal, Geçmişten Geleceğe Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Atayurt Yayınları, Ankara, 2021.
[30] Zafer Toprak, “Türkiye İktisat Kongresi ve “Misak-ı İktisadi”,” p. 19.
[31] Türkiye İktisat Kongresi 1923 – İzmir Haberler, Belgeler-Yorumlar, p. 326.
[32] Zafer Toprak, Atatürk: Kurucu Felsefenin Evrimi, Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, İstanbul, 2020, pp. 165-193.
[33] Türkiye İktisat Kongresi 1923-İzmir Haberler-Belgeler-Yorumlar, p. 251.
[34] “Türkiye İktisat Kongresi Açılışında Nutuk,” Mahmut Esat Bozkurt Toplu Eserler, Vol. II, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 2014, pp. 149-156. First published in İktisadi Esaslarımız, Anadolu Matbaası, İzmir, (1339[1923]), pp. 67-76.
[35] “Kongre Başkanı ve Manisa Sanayi Murahhası Kazım Karabekir Paşa,” Türkiye İktisat Kongresi 1923 – İzmir Haberler, Belgeler-Yorumlar, p. 269.
[36] Bilsay Kuruç, op. cit., p. 247.
[37] “Bursa Belediye Heyetine,” Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, Vol. II, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, Ankara, 2006, p. 45.
[38] “İktisat Vekilliğine Seçilme Üzerine Vekâlet’e Mensup Memur Reislerine Tamim,” Mahmut Esat Bozkurt Toplu Eserler, Vol. II, p. 21. (First published in Anadolu’da Yeni Gün, 17 July 1922).
[39] Here are some examples who argue that there was such a message: Yakup Kepenek ve Nurhan Yentürk, Türkiye Ekonomisi, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 1994, p. 32; Çağlar Keyder, Dünya Ekonomisi İçinde Türkiye (1923-1929), Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, 1993, p. 80; Mete Tunçay, op. cit., p. 188.
[40] Fikret Başkaya, Paradigmanın İflası: Resmi İdeolojinin Eleştirisine Giriş, Yordam Kitap, İstanbul, 2018, p. 223.
[41] I made the italics in order to highlight. Türkiye İktisat Kongresi 1923 – İzmir Haberler, Belgeler-Yorumlar, A. Gündüz Ökçün (ed.), p. 252-253.
[42] “Türkiye İktisat Kongresi Açılışında Nutuk,” Mahmut Esat Bozkurt Toplu Eserler, Vol. II, p. 154.
[43] “Kurtarılmış Memleketlerin İktisadi Durumu Hakkında Büyük Millet Meclisi’nde Konuşma,” Mahmut Esat Bozkurt Toplu Eserler, Vol. II, p. 34.
[44] “Zafer İktisadiyatı Hakkında Beyanat,” Mahmut Esat Bozkurt Toplu Eserler, Vol. II, p. 51. (Interview was first published in Anadolu’da Yeni Gün, 31 July 1922).
[45] Ibid., p. 52.
[46] “Türkiye Köy Bankaları Projesinin Gerekçesi,” Mahmut Esat Bozkurt Toplu Eserler, Vol. II, p. 71.
[47] “Kurtarılmış Memleketlerin İktisadi Durumu Hakkında Büyük Millet Meclisi’nde Konuşma,” Mahmut Esat Bozkurt Toplu Eserler, Vol. II, p. 29. (Speech delivered on 30 December 1922).
[48] For those news see Türkiye İktisat Kongresi 1923 – İzmir Haberler, Belgeler-Yorumlar, pp. 6-10; “İktisadi Siyasetimiz Hakkında Beyanat,” Mahmut Esat Bozkurt Toplu Eserler, Vol. II, p. 148 (Interview first published in Anadolu’da Yeni Gün, 22 February 1923).
[49] “Türkiye İktisat Kongresi Açılışında Nutuk,” Mahmut Esat Bozkurt Toplu Eserler, Vol. II, p. 150.
[50] Michael M. Firefrock, op.cit., p. 377; Margaret S. Hoell, op. cit., p. 7.
[51] Şevket Pamuk, Türkiye’nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2018, p. 191-182.
[52] Zafer Toprak, 1993; İhsan Ömer Atagenç, op. cit.; Murat Koraltürk, op. cit., p. 98-99.
[53] “Türkiye İktisat Kongresi Açılışında Nutuk,” Mahmut Esat Bozkurt Toplu Eserler, Vol. II, p. 153.
[54] Ibid., p. 154.
[55] Chester Projesi Hakkında Mülakat,” Mahmut Esat Bozkurt Toplu Eserler, Vol. II, pp. 88-89. (First published in Hakimiyet-i Milliye, 6 April 1923).
[56] “Türkiye Devlet Ticaret Bankası Kanun Tasarısı Gerekçesi,” Mahmut Esat Bozkurt Toplu Eserler, Vol. II, p. 113.
[57] “İtilaf Devletleri, Sovyet Rusya Gürcistan ve Ermenistan ile Olan Münasebetler Hakkında – 3 Ocak 1921,” Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, Vol. I, p. 138.
[58] “İstanbul Gazetecileriyle İzmit Kasrı Mülakatı,” Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları 1923, Kopernik, İstanbul, 2019, p. 82. Mustafa Kemal, Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları (1923), Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 1993, p. 96.
[59] “Eskişehir Konuşması 15.1.1923,” Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları 1923, Kopernik, İstanbul, 2019, p. 64-65. Mustafa Kemal, Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları (1923), Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 1993, p. 74.
[60] “İzmit Sineması’nda Halka Konuşma 19.1.1923,” Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları 1923, Kopernik, İstanbul, 2019, p. 154. Mustafa Kemal, Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları (1923), Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 1993, p. 191.
[61] “İstanbul Gazetecileriyle İzmit Kasrı Mülakatı,” Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları 1923, Kopernik, İstanbul, 2019, p. 138. Mustafa Kemal, Eskişehir-İzmit Konuşmaları (1923), Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 1993, p. 171.
[62] “Tevfik Paşa ile Muhaberatı Hakkında,” Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, Vol. I, p. 159.
[63] Bilsay Kuruç, 2012, p. 247; Serdar Şahinkaya, Gazi Mustafa Kemal ve Cumhuriyet Ekonomisinin İnşası, ODTÜ Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2009.
[64] Ertuğrul Zekai Ökte, Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün Yurtiçi Gezileri (1922-1931), Vol. I, Tarih Araştırmaları Vakfı, İstanbul, 2000, p. 70.
[65] “Alaşehir’de Halkla Konuşma,” Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, Vol. II, p. 76.
[66] Gündüz Ökçün, 1920-1930 Yılları Arasında Kurulan Türk Anonim Şirketlerinde Yabancı Sermaye, Sermaye Kurulu Piyasası, Ankara, 1997.
[67] Erik Jan Zürcher, Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1998, p. 283.
[68] Türkiye İktisat Kongresi 1923-İzmir Haberler-Belgeler-Yorumlar, p. 254.
[69] NA (National Archives, Kew Londra), HS 3/217.
[70] Türkiye İktisat Kongresi 1923-İzmir Haberler-Belgeler-Yorumlar, p. 85.
[71] Bilsay Kuruç, op. cit., p. 307-308.
[72] Zafer Toprak, “100. Yıldönümünde Türkiye İktisat Kongresi,” p. 29.
[73] Murat Koraltürk, op. cit., pp. 99-100; Ahmet Hamdi Başar’ın Hatıraları “Gazi Bana Çok Kızmış!, Murat Koraltürk (ed.), İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, pp. 150-151.
[74] Nilüfer Uğurlu Şenel, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt ve Türk İnkılabına Etkisi, İdil Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2012, pp. 115-116.